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Hate Crimes and the War on Terror 
Cynthia Lee* 
 
 On September 11, 2001, nineteen Arab Muslims hijacked four commercial airplanes in 
the United States, flying two of these planes into the World Trade Center in New York City, 
killing an estimated 2,759 people.1  They flew a third plane into the Pentagon in Northern 
Virginia, just minutes from Washington, D.C., killing another 125.2  The fourth plane never 
made it to its intended target, presumably the White House in Washington, D.C., crashing 
instead into a remote field in Pennsylvania, killing all 44 on board.3 
 
 In the days, weeks, and months immediately following the 9/11 attacks, Arab-Americans, 
South Asian-Americans, Muslim-Americans, and Sikh-Americans were the targets of 
widespread hate violence.4  Many of the perpetrators of these acts of hate violence claimed they 
were acting patriotically by retaliating against those responsible for 9/11. 
 
 This chapter situates the private acts of hate violence committed against Arab-Americans, 
Muslim-Americans, Sikh-Americans, and South Asian-Americans in the aftermath of 9/11 into 
the broader context of the war on terror. Despite public pronouncements condemning these 
private acts of hate violence, the government engaged in its own acts of “psychic” and physical 
violence against Arabs, Muslims, Sikhs and South Asians, all in the name of the war on terror.5    
Like Muneer Ahmad, Leti Volpp, and others, I argue that both private and public acts of violence 
against individuals perceived to be Arab or Muslim can be understood as two sides of the same 
coin – a coin made possible by the social construction of the Arab-as-Terrorist stereotype.6  
Obviously, this stereotype affects Arabs, Muslims, and those individuals perceived to be Arab or 
Muslim.  I argue in addition that the Arab-as-Terrorist stereotype affects us all by encouraging 
lawmakers to give police expanded authority which encroaches on the civil liberties of all 
citizens. 
 
 This chapter is divided into three parts.  In Part I, after providing some general 
background information on hate crimes, I discuss the hate crimes committed in the aftermath of 
9/11.  In Part II, I examine two common stereotypes about Arabs and Muslims which likely 
contributed to the post 9/11 backlash against Arabs and Muslims and those perceived to be Arab 
or Muslim: the Arab-as-Terrorist stereotype and the Arab-as-Foreigner stereotype.  In Part III, I 
suggest that government action in the war on terror was influenced by and reinforced these 
stereotypes.  I conclude by discussing broader possible implications of the Arab-as-Terrorist 
stereotype. 
 
I 
Hate Crimes in the Aftermath of 9/11 
 
 A hate crime is a crime against an individual on account of his race, religion, national 
origin, ethnicity, or some other protected characteristic.7  Supporters of hate crime legislation 
argue that hate crimes merit enhanced punishment because of the greater harm they cause.  For 
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example, Frederick Lawrence notes that the harm caused by hate crimes is greater than the harm 
caused by other crimes because of “the nature of the injury sustained by the immediate victim of 
a bias crime; the palpable harm inflicted on the broader target community of the crime; and the 
harm to society at large.”8 
 
Hate crime statutes tend to follow one of two models: (1) the "discriminatory selection" 
model and (2) the "racial animus" model.9  Under the "discriminatory selection" model, a 
defendant's punishment is enhanced if he chose his victim because of the victim's membership in 
a protected group.10  The prosecutor need not show that defendant acted because of any animus 
or hostility toward the victim because of his race, religion, ethnicity, gender, or other protected 
status.   
 
Lu-in Wang gives examples of two defendants who could be punished under the 
“discriminatory selection" model.  First, "[o]ne such perpetrator would be the purse snatcher who 
preys exclusively on women, not because he feels hostility toward women as a group, but 
because their general practice of carrying handbags or their typically small stature makes them, 
for the most part, easier targets than men."11  Second, "a juvenile delinquent who chooses to rob 
grocery stores owned by recent immigrants from Asia because she presumes that those 
merchants have lots of cash on hand" would be punishable under the discriminatory selection 
model even if she bore no hostility toward Asians as a group.12 
 
Under the "racial animus" model, the defendant must choose his victim because of the 
victim’s membership in a protected group and "hatred or hostility toward the target group."13  
The individuals described above (the purse snatcher who targets women and the juvenile 
delinquent who targets recent immigrants from Asia) would not be subject to enhanced 
punishment under the racial animus model because they were not acting out of hostility toward 
the victim's group. 
 
Wang notes that the cases that tend to be prosecuted are those that conform to the "racial 
animus" model.14  This is problematic because the racial animus model perpetrates an overly 
simplistic view of the bias criminal as an irrational deviant unlike most of us.15  The racial 
animus model makes it easy for us to distance ourselves from the perpetrators of hate crimes 
even though we often share many of the same underlying biases. 
 
 One of the first laws exclusively criminalizing bias motivated conduct in the United 
States is found in Section 245 of volume 18 of the U.S. Code, enacted in the 1960s.16  This 
statute makes it a crime to try to stop another person on the basis of race, color, national origin or 
religion from engaging in any one of six federally protected activities: (1) enrolling in or 
attending a public school; (2) participating in a service or facility provided by a State; (3) 
engaging in employment; (4) serving as a juror; (5) traveling or using any common carrier 
(motor, rail, water or air) in interstate commerce; and (6) enjoying the services of any hotel or 
motel or any restaurant, cafeteria, lunch counter, gas station, motion picture house, theater, 
concert hall, sports arena, stadium or any other establishment which serves the public.17 
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 Because Section 245 is limited to attempts to interfere with the exercise of a civil right,18 
many states began enacting hate crime laws of their own in the 1980s and 1990s.19  Today, forty-
five of the fifty states and the District of Columbia have hate crime laws on the books.20  All of 
these statutes criminalize or enhance punishment for conduct motivated by bias on the basis of 
race, ethnicity, and religion.21  At least twenty-six states include crimes motivated by sexual 
orientation bias.22  At least twenty-four states include crimes motivated by bias on the basis of 
gender.23 
 
 In 1990, Congress passed the Hate Crimes Statistics Act which requires the United States 
Department of Justice to collect data on hate crimes from law enforcement agencies.24  Specific 
data about hate crimes against Arabs and Muslims and those perceived to be Arab or Muslim, 
however, is not collected.25  Because the data collected by the Department of Justice under this 
Act inadequately captures information regarding hate violence directed against Arabs and 
Muslims and those perceived to be Arab or Muslim, it is necessary to look to other sources for 
such information.  A few community-based organizations filled this void by specifically 
collecting information about acts of hate violence in the wake of 9/11.   
 
 For example, South Asian American Leaders of Tomorrow (SAALT) found that in just 
the first week following the 9/11 attacks, 645 bias incidents directed at individuals perceived to 
be of Middle Eastern descent, including shootings, verbal harassment in the streets, telephone 
threats to individuals in their homes, property damage and violence at places of worship, and 
racial jokes made in the workplace, were reported by newspapers and other media.26  The 
Council on American-Islamic Relations (CAIR) received reports of 1,717 anti-Muslim and anti-
Arab bias incidents, including violence, threats, hate messages and harassment, airport profiling, 
and workplace and school discrimination, after September 11, 2001.27  While some of the 
incidents included in these numbers are bias incidents, not hate crimes,28 these reports 
nonetheless are consistent with information collected by the FBI showing a 17-fold increase in 
anti-Muslim crimes nationwide in 2001.29 
 
 Just after September 11, numerous Arabs, Muslims, and individuals perceived to be Arab 
or Muslim were assaulted, and some killed,30 by individuals who believed they were responsible 
for or connected to the attacks on the World Trade Center and Pentagon.31  The first backlash 
killing occurred four days after September 11.32  Balbir Singh Sodhi was shot to death on 
September 15 as he was planting flowers outside his Chevron gas station.33  The man who shot 
Sodhi, Frank Roque, had told an employee of an Applebee’s restaurant that he was “going to go 
out and shoot some towel heads.”34  Roque mistakenly thought Sodhi was Arab because Sodhi, 
an immigrant from India, had a beard and wore a turban as part of his Sikh faith.35  After 
shooting Sodhi, Roque drove to a Mobil gas station a few miles away and shot at a Lebanese-
American clerk.36  He then drove to a home he once owned and shot and almost hit an Afghani 
man who was coming out the front door.37  When he was arrested two hours later, Roque shouted, 
“I stand for America all the way.”38 
 
 The next two killings were committed by a man named Mark Stroman.  On September 15, 
2001, Stroman shot and killed Waquar Hassan, an immigrant from Pakistan, at Hassan’s grocery 
store in Dallas, Texas.39  On October 4, 2001, Stroman shot and killed Vasudev Patel, an 
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immigrant from India and a naturalized U.S. citizen, while Patel was working at his Shell station 
convenience store.40  A store video camera recorded the killing, helping police to identify 
Stroman as the killer.41  Stroman later told a Dallas television station that he shot Hassan and 
Patel because, “We’re at war.  I did what I had to do.  I did it to retaliate against those who 
retaliated against us.”42 
 
 Beyond these killings, there were more than a thousand other anti-Muslim or anti-Arab 
acts of hate which took the form of physical assaults, verbal harassment and intimidation, arson, 
attacks on mosques, vandalism, and other property damage.43  Many individuals reported being 
intimidated on the road by drivers and pedestrians who pointed fingers at them as if shooting 
them.44  Businesses were hit with gasoline bombs, and homes and places of worships were 
vandalized.45  In approximately one in every five cases, the victim suffered bodily injury from 
physical assault.46  In each of these acts of hate violence, the perpetrators chose their victims 
because they believed them to be Arab or Muslim.  Their acts of violence were intended as 
payback for the death and destruction brought about by terrorists on September 11.  Payback , 
however, makes sense only if the targets of the post-9/11 hate violence were in fact linked to the 
9/11 terrorists.  No evidence has come to light indicating that any of the backlash victims had 
anything to do with the 9/11 attacks.  The 9/11 terrorists were Arab Muslim men with links to Al 
Qaeda.  Many of the victims of post-9/11 hate violence were neither Arab nor Muslim, yet these 
men were selected because their perpetrators thought they were Arab or Muslim and in some 
way responsible for 9/11.  How could so many individuals leap to such an erroneous conclusion?  
The answer, I suggest, lies in the construction of the Arab-as-terrorist stereotype. 
 
II 
Stereotypes about Arabs and Muslims 
 
 Many Americans do not know the difference between Arabs47 and Muslims and think 
that all Arabs are Muslim and all Muslims are Arab.  Not all Arabs, however, are Muslim and 
not all Muslims are Arab.  Muslims are people who believe in or adhere to the religion of 
Islam.48  Though the vast majority of Arabs are Muslim,49 approximately 15 million Arab 
Christians reside in Arab-speaking countries today.50  The majority of Arabs living in the United 
States today are Christian, not Muslim.51  A 2001 Zogby survey found that 42% of Arab-
Americans are Catholic, 23% are Orthodox, 12% are Protestant, and only 23% are Muslim.52  In 
other words, approximately 77% of the Arabs in America are not Muslim. 
 
 As noted above, not all Muslims are Arab.  Islam has nearly 1.5 billion adherents of 
many ethnic, national, and racial backgrounds throughout the world.53  Only 12% of Muslims 
worldwide are Arab.54  In the United States, Arab-Americans represent only a small percentage 
of the total Muslim population.  According to one survey, 42% of Muslims in the United States 
are African-American, 24.4% are South Asian, and only 12.4% are Arab.55 
 
 One reason why Arabs and Muslims may often be confused is that over 90 percent of all 
Arabs are Muslim.56  In addition, there is considerable overlap between Arab and Muslim 
cultures.57  According to Sylvia Nassar-McMillan: 
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Islam is believed to have begun sometime between the 7th and 10th centuries A.D., 
when the Prophet Mohammed became known to the people inhabiting the 
Arabian Peninsula.  He claimed to be the messenger of God, delivering the word 
of God as communicated to him by the Archangel Gabriel.  Unifying within their 
new common faith, the people formed a nation, henceforth known as the Arab 
Nation.58 
 
The Arab-as-Terrorist Stereotype 
   
 The conflation of Arabs and Muslims has contributed to the construction of the Arab (or 
Muslim)-as-Terrorist stereotype.59  The Arab-as-Terrorist stereotype, however, is not a new 
stereotype.  Even before September 11, Arabs and Muslims were stereotyped as terrorists.60  As 
Karen Engle notes, in America, Arabs are presumed to be Muslim, and Muslims are “suspected 
of having greater fealty to their religion – one that is often equated with terrorism – than to the 
United States.”61  Engle points out that “the terrorism-Islam conflation has become so ingrained 
in the American mind set that initial media reports after the 1995 bombing of the federal building 
in Oklahoma simply assumed that the culprits were from the Middle East.”62  As we now know, 
an American named Timothy McVeigh was responsible for that act of terrorism.63  Nonetheless, 
the government received more than 200 reports of harassment, threats and assaults against Arab-
Americans and Muslim-Americans following this incident.64   
 
 In 1980, Dr. Jack Shaheen, Professor Emeritus at Southern Illinois University, began 
research on motion pictures with Arab portraits and themes.65  By the completion of his project, 
Shaheen had found more than 900 feature films released between 1896 and 2001 which 
contained Arab storylines, settings, and character casts.66  Not surprisingly, Arabs were portrayed 
as bad guys in the vast majority of these feature films.67  Only a handful of films depicted Arabs 
as heroes or ordinary people.68 
 
 One example of this can be found in Rules of Engagement (2000), a film starring Samuel 
Jackson and Tommy Lee Jones which Shaheen describes as “promot[ing] a dangerously 
generalized portrayal of Arabs as rabidly anti-American.”69  During the film, U.S. Marines open 
fire on 83 Yemeni men, women, and children.70  Initially, the audience is led to sympathize with 
the Yemeni victims.  The camera follows a young girl with only one leg who was disabled in the 
gunfire, then shows other men, women, and children suffering from gunshot wounds at a nearby 
hospital.  As the story unfolds, however, the audience learns that the disabled girl and other 
apparently innocent victims were not so innocent after all. We find out that the men, women and 
children in the crowd had weapons and began firing on the Marines who shot back in self-
defense.71  In the end, the U.S. Marines are vindicated.  The attack on the Yemeni civilians is 
portrayed as a justified act. 
 
 Another example Shaheen uses is True Lies (1994), a film in which Arnold 
Schwarzenegger plays a secret agent whose mission is to track down nuclear warheads stolen 
from Kazakhstan.  Schwarzenegger finds out that a radical Islamic terrorist group named 
“Crimson Jihad” is trying to smuggle the nuclear warheads into the United States.  The story 
follows Schwarzenegger’s battles with Salim Abu Aziz, the leader of the terrorist group. 
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 In the meantime, Schwarzenegger’s wife, played by Jamie Lee Curtis, is unaware that her 
husband is a spy and believes he is a boring computer salesman.  Curtis craves adventure which 
she thinks her husband can’t give her.  Schwarzenegger finds out that his wife is on the verge of 
having an affair with a man pretending to be a spy.  Schwarzenegger decides to engage his wife 
in a fake spy operation and gets her to perform a striptease in front of him while he hides his face 
in the shadows.  Eventually, Curtis finds out that her husband is a true spy and they live happily 
ever after. 
 
 When True Lies was released, it garnered mostly positive reviews.  The movie earned 
$146 million in the United States and more than $200 million abroad, making it the third best 
grossing movie in 1994.72 Jamie Lee Curtis received a Golden Globe for best actress in a 
Musical/Comedy.73  For most people who saw this film when it first came out, Jamie Lee Curtis’ 
striptease scene was probably the most memorable part of the movie, not that the movie 
portrayed Arabs as crazed terrorists intent on harming Americans.  This portrayal may not have 
been particularly striking because it fit within our expectations of what Arab people are like.   
 
 While the image of the Arab-as-Terrorist is not a new stereotype, it has become 
increasingly entrenched in the public imagination since 9/11 because of the increased frequency 
of news coverage of actual Islamic terrorism.  Burned into our memories is the real-life image of 
hooded masked men holding American journalist Daniel Pearl hostage and declaring his 
beheading to the world.74  Anyone who watches the news has seen video footage of jihadist 
training camps depicting men in black face masks with assault style machine guns engaging in 
rigorous boot camp exercises as if preparing for hand-to-hand combat.  Increasingly we hear of 
Arab men, and sometimes Arab women,75 strapping bombs to themselves and acting as suicide 
bombers.  
 
 The effect of these fictional and real-life images of Arabs as terrorists came to a head 
with the attacks on the World Trade Center and Pentagon.  Despite widespread contemporary 
condemnation of the internment of Americans of Japanese descent during World War II,76 a 
Gallup Poll taken after 9/11 found that one in every three Americans supported internment for 
Americans of Arab descent.77  And even though racial profiling of African-Americans and 
Latinos was widely condemned just prior to 9/11,78 a CNN/USA Today/Gallup Poll taken shortly 
afer 9/11 found that a majority of Americans supported the racial profiling of persons of Middle 
Eastern descent.79  The same poll found that 49% of the adults surveyed thought all Arab-
Americans should have to carry special identification cards.80  As Sharon Davies notes, the post-
9/11 racial profiling of individuals of Middle Eastern descent was euphemistically called “ethnic 
profiling” and “was met with shrugs of resignation rather than shouts of protest, signaling a sea 
change in the nation’s thinking about profiling practices from its new, post 9/11 perspective.”81 
 
 There is such anti-Muslim sentiment in America today that opponents of presidential 
candidate Barack Obama have attempted to spread false rumors over the Internet alleging that 
Obama is Muslim and a “Muslim plant” in a conspiracy against America.82  In a poll of 
American citizens conducted by the Pew Research Center for the People and the Press in August 
2007, 45% of respondents said they would be less likely to vote for a candidate who is Muslim 
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than any other candidate, compared with 25% who said the same about a Mormon candidate and 
16% who said the same for a candidate who is an evangelical Christian.83  Senator Obama, a 
member of the congregation of the United Church of Christ in Chicago, has openly 
acknowledged that his paternal grandfather, a Kenyan farmer, was Muslim and that he (Senator 
Obama) spent part of his childhood living in Indonesia, a predominantly Muslim country.84  
Additionally, Obama’s stepfather occasionally attended services at a mosque in Indonesia.85 
 
 The Arab (or Muslim)-as-Terrorist stereotype victimizes more than just Arabs and 
Muslims.  Anyone who “appears” to be Arab or Muslim is suspect.  I put the word “appears” in 
quotes because Muslim people (adherents of Islam) are of all different colors, races and 
ethnicities, and one cannot tell simply by a person’s appearance whether he or she is Muslim.86  
Moreover, it is difficult to tell from appearance alone whether an individual is Arab.  South 
Asians –  individuals from India, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, Nepal, and Bhutan –  are 
often misidentified as Arab because of their dark skin and dark hair.87  Sikhs – adherents of the 
Sikh religion – are also often misidentified as Arab or Muslim because of their long beards and 
turbans which may remind people of Osama bin Laden, often seen in news footage wearing a 
long beard and turban.88  It is telling that the first three individuals killed as part of the backlash 
against the 9/11 terrorist attacks –  Waqar Hasan, Balbir Singh Sodhi, and Vasudev Patel –  were 
of South Asian descent.89  According to one report, 96% of the victims of backlash violence in 
the three months following 9/11 were of South Asian descent.90  
 
 Besides broadening the pool of potential victims, the Arab-as-Terrorist stereotype has 
also broadened the pool of possible perpetrators of bias-motivated conduct, though not 
necessarily conduct that would be punishable as a hate crime.  Trigger-happy individuals filled 
with hatred are not the only ones who have been influenced by the Arab-as-Terrorist stereotype. 
On May 22, 2006, one nervous American Airlines passenger grabbed a fellow passenger sitting 
directly in front of him as that passenger was settling down with a book and a ginger ale less than 
an hour into the flight.91  Thinking he was apprehending a would-be Islamic terrorist, Michael 
Wilk grabbed the passenger from behind and held him in headlock.92  He then went into the 
passenger’s pocket and removed his passport and iPod.93 
 
 It turns out the suspicious looking passenger wasn’t an Islamic terrorist but rather a 
British interior designer with Jewish roots named Seth Stein.94  Mr. Stein was later told by airline 
personnel that he was targeted by Wilk because he was using an iPod, had used the lavatory 
when he got on the plane, and had tan skin that made him appear Arab.95  Even worse, one or 
two passengers went up to Wilk (the passenger who assaulted Stein) afterwards and thanked him 
for his action.96  American Airlines apologized to Stein and offered him $2,000, but later 
withdrew their offer fearing that it would be seen as an admission of liability.97  In other 
incidents, commercial airline personnel have barred passengers who were or looked like they 
were from the Middle East from getting on flights.98 
 
 Another example occurred on September 13, 2002, when a woman eating breakfast at a 
Shoney’s restaurant in a small town in north Georgia saw three men who appeared to be of 
Middle Eastern descent and thought she overheard them plotting another 9/11-like attack.99  
Eunice Stone claimed she heard the men say, “Well, if they’re mourning 9/11, what are they 
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going to do about 9/13?”100  They then laughed and talked about “bringing it down.”101  Stone 
took down the license plate numbers from the cars the men were driving and called police.102 
 
 About 1 a.m. the next day, the three men were pulled over by police on a section of 
Florida’s Interstate 75 known as Alligator Alley.103  They were handcuffed, interrogated, and 
held in separate police cars all night.104  17 hours after they were pulled over, they were finally 
released.105 
 
 It turns out the three men were medical students heading to a nine week course in Miami.  
They were also U.S. citizens of Middle Eastern descent.106  One was born in Detroit, Michigan to 
Pakistani immigrant parents.107  The other two men were naturalized U.S. citizens from Jordan 
living in Chicago.108  All three men denied joking or talking about 9/11 or another terrorist attack.  
Stone had also told police that the men she overheard were speaking in Arabic, but only one of the 
three men knew Arabic, so it would have been impossible for the three of them to carry on a conversation 
in Arabic. 109   
 
In response to negative publicity about the incident, Stone stated, “First off, I would like to say 
that I didn’t do any of this for any kind of publicity.  I did it as an American.” Law enforcement 
authorities and citizens alike praised Eunice Stone for reporting her suspicions to police.  Former 
Senator Bob Graham of Florida, who was serving as the Chair of the Senate Select Committee 
on Intelligence at the time, 110 told news media, “I especially commend the actions of the private 
citizen in Calhoun, Georgia, who reported this suspicious activity to the proper authorities.  This 
is exactly the kind of citizen involvement that this war on terrorism is going to require as we seek 
to protect our homeland.”111  Tim Moore, a Florida state official, also commended Stone.  “Just 
think if we could get every American to do that, then every town would be safe.”112 
 
The Arab-as-Foreigner Stereotype 
 
 The “race-ing” of Arab-Americans, Muslim Americans, and those perceived to be Arab 
or Muslim is multi-faceted.113  The Arab looking person is not just raced as a terrorist; he is also 
raced as foreign.114  As Leti Volpp notes, many of those who were the targets of post-9/11 hate 
violence were formally citizens of the United States, either through birth or naturalization.115  
Nonetheless, they were not considered citizens as a matter of identity.116  Just as Japanese 
Americans during World War II were considered first and foremost Japanese, rather than 
Americans of Japanese descent (even though many had never even been to Japan), Arab 
Americans today are considered first and foremost Arabs, rather than Americans of Arab descent.  
 
 Recognizing that the “Arab (or Muslim)-looking” person is raced not only as a terrorist, 
but also as a foreigner helps us understand why the Bush administration has increased funding in 
two main areas: counter-terrorism and immigration enforcement.  In October 2007, the 
Washington Post reported that under the Bush administration, the Department of Justice has 
retreated from vigorous prosecutions of mobsters, white collar criminals, environmental crimes, 
and traditional civil rights infractions and has instead focused on immigration and terrorism 
related investigations. 117  Apparently, the current administration believes that in order to prevent 
the next terrorist attack, we must be vigilant about ferreting out illegal immigrants.   
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 The public seems to feel the same way.  Since 9/11, anti-illegal immigration fervor has 
become more pronounced.  For example, under mounting pressure from constituents opposed to 
illegal immigration, in October 2006, Congress passed legislation authorizing the construction of 
700 miles of fencing along the U.S. and Mexican border.118  Also in 2006, anti-illegal 
immigration forces launched a “Send-A-Brick” campaign, encouraging its supporters to send 
bricks to members of Congress, asking them to stop the flood of illegal immigration.119  In 2007, 
President George W. Bush’s attempts to enact immigration reform legislation met with fierce 
opposition from his Republican base because of provisions that would have allowed 
undocumented immigrants to become lawful permanent residents if they fulfilled certain 
requirements.120  Since July 2006, more than a hundred municipalities have passed legislation 
designed to penalize businesses that hire and landlords who rent to undocumented immigrants.121  
Some counties have deputized their police officers to act as immigration officers.122  In 
September 2007, Virginia government officials announced they were considering a proposal – 
the first of its kind in the nation –  to build a prison just for illegal immigrants accused of 
crimes.123  Eventually, the proposal was rejected by the Virginia Crime Commission’s 
Immigration Task Force.124 
 
III 
The War on Terror 
 
 In the days, weeks, and months after September 11, 2001, the Bush Administration took 
conscientious steps to assure the public that its fight was against terrorism, not against all Arabs 
and Muslims.  On September 17, 2001, President George W. Bush visited the Islamic Center of 
Washington, D.C. where he stated, “The face of terror is not the true faith of Islam.  That’s not 
what Islam is all about.  Islam is peace.  These terrorists don’t represent peace.  They represent 
evil and war.”125  On September 19, 2001, President Bush told President Megawati of Indonesia, 
the country with the world’s largest Muslim population,126 “I’ve made it clear, Madam President, 
that the war against terrorism is not a war against Muslims, nor is it a war against Arabs.  It’s a 
war against evil people who conduct crimes against innocent people.”127  Again on September 27, 
2001, President Bush told airline employees at O’Hare International Airport in Chicago, Illinois, 
“Americans understand we fight not a religion; ours is not a campaign against the Muslim faith.  
Ours is a campaign against evil.”128  
 
 President Bush also explicitly condemned the acts of bigotry and hatred committed by 
private individuals against Arabs, Muslims, and those perceived to be Arab or Muslim.  In a 
speech in San Jose, California on April 30, 2002, President Bush declared:  
 
America rejects bigotry.  We reject every act of hatred against people of Arab 
background or Muslim faith.  America values and welcomes peaceful people of all faiths 
– Christian, Jewish, Muslim, Sikh, Hindu and many others.  Every faith is practiced and 
protected here, because we are one country.  Every immigrant can be fully and equally 
American because we’re one country.  Race and color should not divide us, because 
America is one country.129 
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 Despite these public pronouncements, post-9/11 government action in the war on terror 
has helped foster the belief that all Muslims and Arabs are to be viewed with suspicion.  Three 
government actions in particular deserve mention.130  
 
Post 9/11 Detentions 
 
 First, in the weeks immediately following the September 11 attacks, the government 
began secretly arresting and detaining Arab, Muslim, and South Asian men.131 Within the first 
two months after the attacks, the government had detained at least 1,200 men.132  
 
The September 11 detainees were not immediately informed of the charges against 
them.133  Some were discouraged from obtaining counsel and others were denied access to 
counsel.134  Family members were kept in the dark as to their loved ones whereabouts.135  Most 
of the detainees were held for minor immigration violations and had no connection to 
terrorism.136  Nonetheless, they were treated like violent criminals and verbally and/or physically 
abused by corrections officials.137  Some detainees complained of being called “Bin Laden, Jr.” 
and being told “You’re going to die here,” and “You’re never going to get out of here.”138  
Others reported painfully tight handcuffs and being repeatedly slammed against the wall.139  One 
detainee said that a corrections officer bent his finger back until it touched his wrist.140  Another 
detainee said officers repeatedly twisted his arm which was in a cast and a finger which was 
recovering from a recent operation.141   
 
Although the Bureau of Prisons directed the wardens of correctional facilities where the 
September 11 detainees were being held to preserve videotapes of the detainees in their cells and 
detainee movement outside the cells, correctional staff destroyed hundreds of tapes, allegedly to 
free up storage space.142  Consequently, videotapes that could have helped prove or disprove 
allegations of abuse raised by September 11 detainees were not available to the Office of 
Inspector General for the Department of Justice when it conducted an investigation into the 
treatment of aliens held on immigration charges in connection with the investigation into the 
September 11 attacks.143 
 
 “Voluntary” Interview Program 
 
 Second, in November 2001, the Department of Justice began efforts to “interview” 
approximately 5,000 men between the ages of 18 and 33 from Middle Eastern or Muslim nations 
who had arrived in the United States within the previous two years on a temporary student, 
tourist, or business visa and were lawful residents of the United States.144  Four months later, the 
government announced it would seek to interview an additional 3,000 men from countries with 
an Al Qaeda presence.145  According to then Attorney General John Ashcroft, these men were 
selected not because of their ethnicity or religious affiliation, but because they “fit the criteria of 
persons who might have knowledge of foreign-based terrorists.”146  To carry out this program, 
the Justice Department sent out letters “inviting” these men to come for “voluntary” 
interviews.147 
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 Arab-American groups protested that the government was engaging in racial profiling.148  
Ashcroft, however, responded that “[t]hese individuals were not selected in order to single out a 
particular ethnic or religious group, which suggests that one ethnic or religious group is more 
prone to terrorism than another.  I emphatically reject that proposition . . .”149  A few weeks later, 
however, an internal memo from the INS was leaked to the press, suggesting that the interviews 
were being used to identify immigration violations and persons connected with the September 11 
attacks.150 
 
 Law professor Tracey Maclin notes that while reasonable minds might differ with the 
Attorney General’s assertion that the individuals were not racially or ethnically profiled, there 
was no debate concerning one key point: “[t]here was no evidence revealed to the public that the 
men targeted for interrogations had any connection with terrorism or the events of September 
11.”151  Maclin concludes that “the government’s investigative procedure following September 
11 amounted to an ethnic-based fishing expedition.”152 
 
 Nonetheless, several prominent legal academics have defended the government’s 
“voluntary” interview program.  Samuel Gross and Debra Livingston, for example, argue that 
even if the voluntary interview program constituted ethnic profiling, as long as government 
agents treated the young man of Middle Eastern descent who were asked to come in for 
interviews with respect, then the program is not objectionable.153 
 
 Sherry Colb uses the voluntary interview program to examine whether the post-9/11 
ethnic profiling of Middle Eastern men is different from the racial profiling of black and brown 
drivers and concludes that ethnic profiling of men of Middle Eastern descent, what she called 
nationality-profiling for terrorists, is distinguishable from Driving While Black (a.k.a. DWB) 
profiling for drug couriers.154  Colb asserts, “By contrast to the extremely high probability that 
an aspiring terrorist will turn out to be Arab and/or Muslim, the DWB profiling that has for 
years drawn large-scale condemnation does not carry a similar likelihood of success.”155  She 
continues, “[T]he likelihood that a minority driver has drugs in his car, just because he is 
engaged in one of the minor traffic violations of which almost everyone on the highways guilty, 
is quite small.”156  Colb concludes that “under limited circumstances, profiling on the basis of 
nationality may be constitutionally permissible and even appropriate.”157 
 
The problem with Colb’s argument is that she is not comparing apples to apples.  If we 
are asking about the likelihood that a suspect of a particular race or ethnicity will be a terrorist, 
the question we should be asking is “What is the likelihood that any given Arab American or 
Muslim American is a terrorist?,” not “What is the likelihood that a suspected terrorist will turn 
out to be Arab or Muslim?”  Just as a large percentage of African Americans and Latinos have 
nothing to do with illegal drugs, a large percentage of Arab Americans and Muslim Americans 
have nothing to do with terrorism.  Therefore the likelihood that any given Arab-American or 
Muslim American is a terrorist is probably quite small.158   
 
Special Registration Program (NSEERS) 
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 Third, in September 2002, the government implemented a “Special Registration” 
program also known as NSEERS (National Security Entry-Exit Registration System), requiring 
immigrant men from 26 mostly Muslim countries159 to register their name, address, telephone 
number, place of birth, date of arrival in the United States, height, weight, hair and eye color, 
financial information and the addresses, birth dates and phone numbers of parents and any 
foreign friends with the government.160  Under NSEERS, citizens and nationals of certain 
countries designated by the Attorney General had to report to the Immigration and Naturalization 
Service (INS) upon arrival, within 30 days after arrival, every 12 months after arrival, upon 
changing address, employment, or school, and when departing from the United States.161  
Individuals from designated countries already present in the United States had to submit to a 
call-in registration program and present themselves in person to the INS by a deadline specified 
in the Federal Register.162  They also had to provide photographs and fingerprints.163  Failure to 
comply with any of the special registration rules, including failing to report an address change 
within 10 days, could lead to criminal charges, removal from the United States, and future 
inadmissibility.164  Additionally, if an individual failed to comply with these rules, his or her 
name would be entered into the FBI’s national crime database which is available to state and 
local police.165 
 
 Initially, hundreds of non-citizens, including many who were lawfully in the United 
States pursuing applications for permanent residency, dutifully reported for special registration 
and found themselves arrested and detained by the INS, creating “a climate of fear and feeling of 
betrayal was created among immigrant communities targeted for special registration.”166  Many 
in the affected communities complained that these arrests unfairly penalized individuals simply 
attempting to comply with the law.167  Fearing arrest and imprisonment, many non-citizens from 
the designated countries left homes and well-established businesses and fled to Canada rather 
than report, even though they were lawfully in the United States.168  Aziz Huq, Deputy Director 
of the Justice Program at the Brennan Center at New York University School of Law, notes that 
by the program’s conclusion on December 1, 2003, 83,519 men had come forward voluntarily.169  
Of these voluntary registrants, 13,799 had been placed in deportation proceedings.170  According 
to James Zogby of the Arab American Institute, “In the end, there was no evidence that any 
terrorists were apprehended as a result of the effort.”171 
 
Broader Implications  
 
 The Arab-as-Terrorist stereotype has even broader implications beyond the private acts of 
hate violence and government action discussed above.  The specter of the Arab-as-Terrorist 
conjures up images of sleeper cells waiting to launch another attack on American soil and 
encourages citizens and legal decision-makers alike to embrace expansive law-enforcement 
measures that curtail the civil liberties of us all.  For example, shortly after 9/11, Congress 
hastily passed the USA-PATRIOT Act, giving police the authority to engage in secret searches 
under a provision known as the “sneak and peek” warrant provision.172  Under this provision, 
police can delay giving notice of a search warrant until after executing the search.173  This 
provision is not limited to searches of the homes of suspected terrorists.  It can be applied to the 
search of any person’s home as long as the court “finds reasonable cause to believe that 
providing immediate notification of the execution of the warrant may have an adverse result.”174 
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The PATRIOT Act also expanded the application of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance 
Act (FISA) from situations in which foreign intelligence gathering is the sole or primary purpose 
of the investigation to situations in which foreign intelligence gathering is a “significant” 
purpose of the investigation.175  FISA allows the electronic eavesdropping (wiretapping) of 
citizens and non-citizens in the United States upon a showing of probable cause that the target is 
a foreign power or an agent of a foreign power.176  This is a significant departure from the 
probable cause showing required under the Fourth Amendment.  Probable cause to search means 
there must be reasonable grounds to believe evidence of a crime will be found in the place to be 
searched.  Probable cause to arrest means there must be reasonable grounds to believe a crime 
has been committed and that the person being arrested committed it.  FISA, in contrast, only 
requires reasonable grounds to believe the target is a foreign power or an agent of a foreign 
power.  Previously, FISA was understood to cover foreign intelligence investigations, not 
ordinary domestic law enforcement investigations.  As amended, FISA can now be used to 
collect evidence against a U.S. citizen for use in a domestic criminal case as long as a 
“significant” purpose of the investigation is foreign intelligence.177  
 
 The fear of another terrorist attack has already fueled other proposals to enhance police 
power.  For example, Harvard law professor Bill Stuntz suggests that 9/11 justifies (1) increased 
police power to seize, search, and question groups of individuals without the usual showing of 
individualized suspicion, (2) secret searches whenever the police want to engage in them, and (3) 
doing away with the Miranda rule.178 
 
 Acknowledging that young men of Middle Eastern descent have found themselves 
increasingly the target of suspicion in a post-9/11 world, Stuntz concludes that such ethnic 
profiling is an inevitable fact of life.179  Given that the system cannot eliminate the race-based 
selection of suspects, Stuntz argues it should attempt to reduce the injury those suspects feel once 
they are selected by law enforcement personnel.180  Stuntz’s solution to the problem of post 9/11 
racial profiling is: (1) to provide incentives for police to engage in group, rather than individual, 
seizures, and (2) to encourage police to treat all suspects more politely.181 
 
 Stuntz also argues that in light of 9/11, police should be allowed to engage in secret 
searches, “whenever the police want to engage in [them], but [would] forbid public disclosure of 
anything uncovered save in a criminal trial.”182  He would also limit the types of crimes the 
government could prove using evidence gathered in a secret search.183 
 
 Finally, Stuntz suggests that the Miranda rule is untenable in a post-9/11 world because a 
terrorist is more likely than the average suspect to invoke his Miranda rights.184  He therefore 
proposes doing away with the Miranda rule which requires police to cease questioning of a 
suspect in custody as soon as that person invokes his right to remain silent or his right to counsel. 
Stuntz would allow police to continue interrogating anyone in custody even if they expressed a 
desire not to talk or asked to see an attorney.185  To decrease the possibility of coercion, Stuntz 
would require all interrogations to be video and audio taped.186  As recent events have made 
clear, however, incriminating videotapes have a habit of getting erased or destroyed, and thus are 
unlikely to provide much deterrent effect.187  
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 It is unclear whether Stuntz’s proposals have caught the attention of any legislators who 
may put his proposals into action.  Nevertheless, the point is that before 9/11, proposals to allow 
the police to engage in group seizures without individualized suspicion as a means of dealing 
with the problem of racial profiling, allowing police to engage in secret searches whenever they 
want to (not just when a judge pre-authorizes such a search), and allowing police to interrogate 
suspects who have asked to speak to a lawyer, would have been unthinkable.  9/11 and the 
specter of the Arab-as-Terrorist have made proposals such as Stuntz’s seem more mainstream 
than they might have appeared before September 11. 
 
Conclusion 
 
 Much work needs to be done to mitigate the damage caused by private and public actors 
responding to 9/11 and the fear of the Arab-as-Terrorist.  As Frederick Lawrence has noted, 
“America, on the whole, has been a staunch defender of the right to be the same or different, 
although it has fallen short in many of its practices.  The question before us is whether progress 
toward tolerance will continue, or whether, as in many regions of the world, a fatal retrogression 
will set in.”188  One step in the right direction is recognizing that Arabs and Muslims are not one 
and the same and that not all Arabs and Muslims are terrorists.  Acknowledging the humanity of 
Arabs and Muslims is a small first step we can take towards combating the Arab (or Muslim)-as-
Terrorist stereotype and the hate violence that can result from this stereotype.  Beyond this, we 
must also recognize that the fear engendered by promotion of the Arab-as-Terrorist stereotype 
can have the deleterious effect of encouraging lawmakers to pass legislation which is aimed at 
making it easier to detain, question, and search suspected terrorists, but which at the same time 
can undermine the civil liberties of us all.   
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